portfolio-verify
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 25, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local bash scripts (e.g.,
propagate-corrections.sh) using arguments derived fromcogni-claims/claims.json. These claims are sourced from the web by research agents, creating a command injection vector if the claim text contains shell metacharacters. - Evidence found in
SKILL.md(Step 8d):bash "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT:-...}/scripts/propagate-corrections.sh" apply "<project-dir>" "<entity-file>" "<field-path>" "<corrected-value>". - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses dynamic path resolution via a subshell to locate its own scripts:
$(ls -td "$HOME"/.claude/plugins/cache/insight-wave/cogni-portfolio/*/ | head -1). Executing code from paths computed at runtime is a risky pattern that can be exploited if the directory structure is manipulated. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection. It ingests untrusted data from the web (claims) and processes it with high-privilege capabilities (file-write and shell execution).
- Ingestion points: Data enters through
cogni-claims/claims.jsonwhich is populated by external research agents. - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are used when processing claim content.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
Read,Write,Edit, andbashsubprocess calls across the project directory. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or validation of the web-sourced content before it is used in shell commands or interpolated into project JSON files.
Audit Metadata