solutions

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 25, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface as it ingests untrusted content from multiple project entities (propositions, features, products, markets, etc.) and incorporates this data into prompts for sub-agents.
  • Ingestion points: Data is read from JSON files in the propositions/, features/, products/, markets/, competitors/, and customers/ directories.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not explicitly define delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands when passing this data to the solution-planner or solution-review-assessor agents.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to Bash, Write, Edit, and Agent tools, which could be leveraged if malicious instructions were successfully injected through the data files.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of content validation or escaping before the external data is interpolated into the agent's context.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Bash tool to execute local utility scripts within the plugin's directory structure.
  • Evidence: It invokes scripts/project-status.sh using a dynamic path resolution logic: ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT:-$(ls -td "$HOME"/.claude/plugins/cache/insight-wave/cogni-portfolio/*/ | head -1)}.
  • Context: This execution is intended for internal project management and relies on the standard location for plugin assets on the host platform.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 25, 2026, 01:51 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — solutions