solutions
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface as it ingests untrusted content from multiple project entities (propositions, features, products, markets, etc.) and incorporates this data into prompts for sub-agents.
- Ingestion points: Data is read from JSON files in the
propositions/,features/,products/,markets/,competitors/, andcustomers/directories. - Boundary markers: The skill does not explicitly define delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands when passing this data to the
solution-plannerorsolution-review-assessoragents. - Capability inventory: The agent has access to
Bash,Write,Edit, andAgenttools, which could be leveraged if malicious instructions were successfully injected through the data files. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content validation or escaping before the external data is interpolated into the agent's context.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to execute local utility scripts within the plugin's directory structure. - Evidence: It invokes
scripts/project-status.shusing a dynamic path resolution logic:${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT:-$(ls -td "$HOME"/.claude/plugins/cache/insight-wave/cogni-portfolio/*/ | head -1)}. - Context: This execution is intended for internal project management and relies on the standard location for plugin assets on the host platform.
Audit Metadata