wiki-query
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes user-controlled or externally-sourced markdown files in the
wiki/directory and uses them to generate answers. - Ingestion points: The agent reads
wiki/index.mdand various files underwiki/<type>/*.mdas part of the core search and synthesis workflow. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions to the agent to treat the content of these files as data only or to ignore any instructions found within the wiki pages.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the
WriteandBashtools, which are used to update the wiki index, logs, and run configuration update scripts. An injection within a wiki page could potentially influence the agent to misuse these tools. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation for content read from the wiki or written back to the synthesis pages.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to run local Python scripts for administrative tasks. - Evidence: It executes
cogni-wiki/skills/wiki-ingest/scripts/config_bump.pyto increment entry counts and optionally runsbacklink_audit.pyto manage internal links. These scripts are internal vendor resources used for the skill's intended functionality. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill writes files to paths derived from user-influenced data (the synthesis slug).
- Evidence: In Step 6 of the workflow, the agent chooses a slug based on the user's question and writes to
wiki/<type>/{slug}.md. Without proper validation of the slug string, there is a risk of directory traversal or overwriting unintended files.
Audit Metadata