email-report
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data originating from external Email Service Providers (ESPs), such as campaign subject lines, body content, and flow names, which could be manipulated to include malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through several MCP tool calls, including
mcp__cogny__klaviyo__list_campaigns,mcp__mailchimp__tool_get_report, andmcp__rule__tool_list_campaigns. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific requirements for using delimiters or boundary markers to isolate external data strings from the agent's instruction set.
- Capability inventory: The skill is authorized to use the
BashandWritetools, and can perform stateful operations viamcp__cogny__write_context_nodeandmcp__cogny__create_finding. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or escaping the retrieved campaign metadata before it is interpolated into the narrative generation prompts for the Slack, CEO, and Deck outputs.
Audit Metadata