wallet-mcp

The skill’s capabilities are broadly consistent with a wallet-integrations suite, and its wallet transaction flows generally preserve user approval. No clear credential theft, hidden exfiltration, obfuscation, or dangerous pre-execution command is evident. However, the unusually broad financial and personal-data scope, third-party action surface, shared embedded credentials, and mutable CLI dependencies create meaningful security and trust risk. Classify as SUSPICIOUS rather than confirmed malware.

This documentation directs wallet and trade data, a hardcoded reusable Bearer token, and (for Permit2) a wallet signature to api[.]o1[.]exchange, and submits API-provided transaction data for user approval or server-side broadcast. It does not demonstrate malware, but the embedded credential and reliance on the exchange to construct or relay transactions are material security concerns; independently verify transaction details and the service before use. Severity: medium; no other domains, IPs, file paths, or credential types are present.

The fragment documents a DEX transaction workflow and contains no direct evidence of malware. It does create a significant trust boundary: wallet and operation details go to an external service, and its returned transaction data is forwarded to wallet execution with no documented independent validation. Treat the service and all returned or pasted transaction data as untrusted; verify transaction targets and effects before approval.