agent-eval

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 5, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local bash script (scripts/agent-eval/audit.sh) using arguments such as <VERSION> and <question> that are directly collected from user input via the AskUserQuestion tool. The interpolation of these unvalidated strings into the shell command creates a potential risk for command injection.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The workflow clones a large variety of external git repositories from corpus.json to the /tmp/codegraph-corpus directory. While many targets are well-known repositories, the skill facilitates the broad downloading and indexing of external third-party code.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The audit process involves significant system-level interaction, specifically mutating the global codegraph installation and later restoring it, which may have unintended side effects on the stability or security of the host environment.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests content from external repositories and reads tool-generated log outputs (parse-run.mjs, parse-session.mjs) to report benchmarking results. Evidence chain:
  • Ingestion points: External repository code and benchmark log outputs (Step 6).
  • Boundary markers: None identified in instructions.
  • Capability inventory: Shell script execution, git operations, and local file system modifications.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of external or user-supplied content is documented.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 5, 2026, 08:25 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — agent-eval