devils-advocate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to ingest and analyze untrusted text provided by users (prompts, plans, arguments), creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Processes user-provided prompts, system instructions, and strategy documents shared during the session (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: The skill instructions do not specify the use of delimiters, XML tags, or "ignore" directives to separate analyzed content from the agent's core instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill leverages external tools such as
mcp__coldiq__search_companiesandmcp__coldiq__find_emailsfor data retrieval. - Sanitization: The instructions lack guidance on sanitizing or escaping user-provided inputs before they are processed by the model.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation includes instructions to fetch and execute external packages from a public registry.
- Evidence: The skill text provides the command
npx -y @coldiq/mcp@latestto download and run the ColdIQ MCP server from the NPM registry. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to interact with external tools to validate claims and perform network-based lookups.
- Evidence: Mentions the use of
mcp__coldiq__find_peopleandmcp__coldiq__find_phoneto verify assumptions within user strategies.
Audit Metadata