linkedin-scheduling
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to install the author's MCP tool package via the npm registry to enable data extraction features.
- Evidence: The command
npx -y @coldiq/mcp@latestis documented inSKILL.mdas the method to connect the environment to the author's API. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill utilizes tools that ingest data from external LinkedIn posts, influencer profiles, and live signals, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: Tools
mcp__coldiq__extract_post_engagement,mcp__coldiq__find_influencers, andmcp__coldiq__find_signalsas described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions or delimiters provided to the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded in the external content.
- Capability inventory: The ingested data is used to inform the agent's recommendations for posting times, frequency, and content velocity strategies described in
SKILL.md. - Sanitization: Absent. The skill instructions do not mention any filtering, validation, or escaping of the external data ingested by the tools.
Audit Metadata