triage
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources by fetching GitHub issue titles and bodies using
gh issue view. - Ingestion points: The process described in
SKILL.mdfetches the full body of target issues usinggh issue view {number}, which exposes the agent to content provided by arbitrary GitHub users. - Boundary markers: The skill instructions do not explicitly use delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded prompts within the retrieved issue data. However, the documentation in
workshop-guide.mdmentions aPostToolUsehook in the delegatedtriage-agentthat performs semantic validation on label applications. - Capability inventory: The skill allows the agent to modify repository metadata through
gh issue edit --add-labeland explore the filesystem usingRead,Glob, andGrep. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or escaping of the issue content is defined in the
SKILL.mdinstructions before the agent processes the data. - [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: Three shell commands are executed at skill load time via the
!commandsyntax inSKILL.mdto populate the prompt with repository metadata, issue counts, and label lists. These are benign read-only operations using the standardghCLI and do not incorporate user-controlled input. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
allowed-toolsfield to restrict shell access to theghbinary (Bash(gh *)). While this provides the agent with write capabilities on GitHub (editing issues), it acts as a security boundary by preventing the execution of arbitrary or unrelated system commands.
Audit Metadata