piv-review-pr
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the project's validation suite (tests, type-checks, builds) directly from the checked-out PR branch. This behavior executes code provided by the PR author; if a PR contains malicious logic within its tests or build configuration, it will be executed within the agent's environment.
- Evidence: Phase 3 instructions to "Run the project's real suite (the
piv-validateskill, or the plan's validation commands)" after performing agh pr checkout. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the GitHub CLI (
gh) to perform actions based on user-supplied$ARGUMENTS. While standard for PR management, it involves passing resolved PR identifiers into shell commands. - Evidence: Shell commands in Phase 1 (
gh pr view {N},gh pr diff {N}) and Phase 6 (gh pr review {N}) utilize variables derived from input arguments. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external PRs, creating an indirect prompt injection surface that could influence the agent's review or behavior.
- Ingestion points: PR metadata (title, body) and source code retrieved via
gh pr viewandgh pr checkoutin SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no explicit instructions or delimiters used to separate untrusted PR data from the agent's analysis instructions.
- Capability inventory: Access to the file system, execution of the GitHub CLI, and the ability to run arbitrary project validation scripts.
- Sanitization: Absent. The skill reads the PR content and passes it directly to the analysis agent and validation tools without filtering.
Audit Metadata