prime-codebase
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting data from external sources (Jira and Confluence) which may contain untrusted content.
- Ingestion points: Jira issue summaries, descriptions, acceptance criteria, and Confluence page content (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: Absent; external content is treated directly as task context without delimitation.
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute local
gitandtreecommands based on the context received. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the retrieved external content is performed before processing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute local system commands to gather repository information.
- Evidence:
tree -L 3 -I 'node_modules|__pycache__|.git|dist|build'and Atlassian MCP tool calls (mcp__atlassian__getJiraIssue,mcp__atlassian__getConfluencePage). - [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill utilizes command substitution at load time to populate the agent's context with repository metadata.
- Evidence:
!git ls-files,!git log -10 --oneline, and!git statusin SKILL.md. - Analysis: These are standard development operations used for orientation and do not involve sensitive data exfiltration or unsanitized user input in the command strings.
Audit Metadata