fb-ad-copy

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 11, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes several local scripts and binaries (rmbc-update-check, rmbc-analytics, and rmbc-workspace) for lifecycle management and telemetry. While these appear to be part of the skill's infrastructure, they run with the user's local permissions.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: A command injection vulnerability exists in the workspace setup logic. The skill takes the user's freeform text input for a product name and interpolates it directly into a shell command: ~/.claude/skills/dtc-copywriting-skills/bin/rmbc-workspace active "<user's answer>". If a user provides input containing shell metacharacters (e.g., "; command; #), arbitrary commands could be executed.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill initiates a background telemetry process (rmbc-analytics) to log usage data, including the skill name and active product name. Although the skill documentation claims data stays on the machine, the underlying script is responsible for the network operations.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill triggers the open command to launch a browser targeting a YouTube URL (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zI8tNfefH1M) for educational content.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted user data (product_description, target_audience) without visible boundary markers or sanitization. This could be used to influence the agent's behavior during the generation phase.
  • Ingestion points: Inputs such as product_description, target_audience, and key_mechanism in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: None identified.
  • Capability inventory: Shell execution (open, sed, mkdir), file writing, and local script execution.
  • Sanitization: No input validation or escaping mechanisms are defined in the instructions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 11, 2026, 01:36 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — fb-ad-copy