fb-ad-copy
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes several local scripts and binaries (
rmbc-update-check,rmbc-analytics, andrmbc-workspace) for lifecycle management and telemetry. While these appear to be part of the skill's infrastructure, they run with the user's local permissions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: A command injection vulnerability exists in the workspace setup logic. The skill takes the user's freeform text input for a product name and interpolates it directly into a shell command:
~/.claude/skills/dtc-copywriting-skills/bin/rmbc-workspace active "<user's answer>". If a user provides input containing shell metacharacters (e.g.,"; command; #), arbitrary commands could be executed. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill initiates a background telemetry process (
rmbc-analytics) to log usage data, including the skill name and active product name. Although the skill documentation claims data stays on the machine, the underlying script is responsible for the network operations. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill triggers the
opencommand to launch a browser targeting a YouTube URL (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zI8tNfefH1M) for educational content. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted user data (
product_description,target_audience) without visible boundary markers or sanitization. This could be used to influence the agent's behavior during the generation phase. - Ingestion points: Inputs such as
product_description,target_audience, andkey_mechanisminSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None identified.
- Capability inventory: Shell execution (
open,sed,mkdir), file writing, and local script execution. - Sanitization: No input validation or escaping mechanisms are defined in the instructions.
Audit Metadata