upsell-sequence-writer
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple external binaries and shell scripts located on the user's file system, specifically
rmbc-update-check,rmbc-analytics, andrmbc-workspace. These paths are dynamically resolved based on the presence of thedtc-copywriting-skillsdirectory in the user's home or local environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The preamble block uses
sed -ito modify the user's~/.rmbc-skills/config.yamlfile to enable or disable analytics based on the user's response to anAskUserQuestionprompt. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill triggers network operations indirectly by calling
rmbc-update-checkandrmbc-analytics. Additionally, it uses theopencommand to launch a browser to a YouTube URL, which, while benign in this context, demonstrates a capability to trigger external actions. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill collects and transmits usage data (skill name, product identifiers, and usage tier) to a remote service via the
rmbc-analyticstool. Although this is gated by a telemetry opt-in, it represents an automated data transmission mechanism. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user inputs (such as
initial_product,upsell_product, andtarget_audience) and interpolates them directly into prompts without boundary markers or sanitization. This creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection if the user-supplied data contains malicious instructions. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads internal configuration and state files (
config.yaml,.intro-seen,.telemetry-prompted) and project-specific research files (research.md,mechanism.md,brief.md) to influence its behavior and logging.
Audit Metadata