config
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents a configuration framework that interpolates external data—such as repository names, branch names, and user-supplied arguments—into shell command templates. This creates an attack surface where malicious metadata from a repository could lead to command injection if the user does not follow the skill's recommendation to use shell quoting (
| shq). - Ingestion points: Repository metadata (Owner, Repo, Path) and user arguments (.Args) ingested into
config.yaml(documented inSKILL.mdandreferences/spawn-patterns.md). - Boundary markers: The documentation recommends using the
| shqpipe for shell quoting, but this is a user-implemented safeguard rather than a hard boundary. - Capability inventory: The skill enables arbitrary shell command execution (
shfields) and file copying (copyfield) across all configuration files. - Sanitization: Mentions safe shell quoting via templates, but relies on correct user implementation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes numerous examples of shell commands intended to be defined in a configuration file and executed by the environment manager, including package management (
npm install), build scripts (make), and terminal automation (tmux,osascript). - Evidence: Found in
SKILL.mdunderusercommandsandreferences/spawn-patterns.mdunderLegacy Spawn Commands.
Audit Metadata