firestore-operations-manager

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 29, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits vulnerability to Indirect Prompt Injection through its features for agent-to-agent (A2A) communication and task orchestration.
  • Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to ingest data from Firestore collections such as a2a_messages, a2a_tasks, and workflows using the get() and onSnapshot() methods as described in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: There are no provided instructions or examples of using boundary markers to separate data from instructions or to warn the agent to ignore commands embedded in the retrieved documents.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful capabilities through the Bash, Write, Edit, and Read tools, which could be exploited if malicious content is retrieved and executed as a command.
  • Sanitization: The skill does not demonstrate any sanitization or validation of the content retrieved from Firestore before it is processed by the agent.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the installation of necessary dependencies from well-known package registries.
  • Evidence: The instructions include commands to install firebase-admin, @google-cloud/firestore, and dotenv via npm install (SKILL.md). These are standard libraries provided by Google and the Node.js community for interacting with Firestore.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands for environment setup and deployment of infrastructure.
  • Evidence: The Bash tool is employed to export service account credentials (GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS), run a local setup script (/firestore-setup), and deploy database rules via the firebase deploy command (SKILL.md).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jun 29, 2026, 07:45 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — firestore-operations-manager