pptx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes multiple local helper scripts including
unpack.py,thumbnail.py,rearrange.py,inventory.py, andreplace.pyto manipulate Office files. It also invokes system utilities likesofficeandpdftoppmfor document conversion tasks. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: A core workflow involves the agent dynamically generating a JavaScript file and executing it via Node.js to create presentations. This pattern of generating and running code at runtime is a risk factor if the generation logic incorporates data from untrusted sources.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Documentation for the skill includes the use of
sudo apt-getfor installing system-level dependencies like LibreOffice and Poppler utilities. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes content extracted from external
.pptxfiles, which serves as an indirect prompt injection surface where instructions hidden in slides could influence agent behavior. - Ingestion points: Text and metadata extraction from PowerPoint files via
markitdownand XML unpacking scripts (e.g.,SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not include the use of clear delimiters or instructions to the agent to disregard embedded commands in the extracted text.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute Python and Node.js scripts, write to the file system, and run shell commands (
soffice,pdftoppm). - Sanitization: While
defusedxmlis used to prevent XML-based attacks, there is no evidence of sanitization or filtering for natural language instructions extracted from the presentation content.
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