se-dev-plugin-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes external CLI tools via Python's subprocess module to perform repository operations.
- Evidence:
scripts/_review_common.pyandscripts/post_review.pyusesubprocess.runto callgit(clone, fetch, diff, ls-tree) andgh(GitHub API access). - Context: Command arguments are constructed using validated inputs, such as commit SHAs checked against hex-format regular expressions and repository IDs matched against a predefined whitelist of hubs.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads content from external GitHub repositories to perform reviews.
- Evidence:
scripts/_review_common.pyusesgit cloneto fetch plugin source code from repositories specified in PR manifests. - Context: These downloads are necessary for the primary function of the skill and target well-known services (GitHub).
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted code and manifests.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads plugin manifest XML files and checks out entire source code repositories from GitHub during the preparation process defined in
scripts/_review_common.py. - Boundary markers: The skill implements a 'post control' mechanism where the agent generates a preview (
comment.preview.md) and must wait for an explicitconfirmresponse from the user before executingscripts/post_review.py. - Capability inventory: The skill can read and write files in the
~/.se-dev/reviews/directory and interact with the GitHub API using the user's authenticated credentials. - Sanitization: The instructions in
SKILL.mdandReviewPolicy.mdexplicitly direct the agent not to trust PR descriptions or external summaries and to perform independent manual review of all in-scope changes.
Audit Metadata