se-dev-plugin-review

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes external CLI tools via Python's subprocess module to perform repository operations.
  • Evidence: scripts/_review_common.py and scripts/post_review.py use subprocess.run to call git (clone, fetch, diff, ls-tree) and gh (GitHub API access).
  • Context: Command arguments are constructed using validated inputs, such as commit SHAs checked against hex-format regular expressions and repository IDs matched against a predefined whitelist of hubs.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads content from external GitHub repositories to perform reviews.
  • Evidence: scripts/_review_common.py uses git clone to fetch plugin source code from repositories specified in PR manifests.
  • Context: These downloads are necessary for the primary function of the skill and target well-known services (GitHub).
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted code and manifests.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads plugin manifest XML files and checks out entire source code repositories from GitHub during the preparation process defined in scripts/_review_common.py.
  • Boundary markers: The skill implements a 'post control' mechanism where the agent generates a preview (comment.preview.md) and must wait for an explicit confirm response from the user before executing scripts/post_review.py.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can read and write files in the ~/.se-dev/reviews/ directory and interact with the GitHub API using the user's authenticated credentials.
  • Sanitization: The instructions in SKILL.md and ReviewPolicy.md explicitly direct the agent not to trust PR descriptions or external summaries and to perform independent manual review of all in-scope changes.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 15, 2026, 07:21 PM