backport-management

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 31, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the GitHub CLI (gh) and Git to automate branch management. This includes high-privilege actions such as merging Pull Requests using the --admin flag. The skill includes strong safety documentation warning against using this flag to bypass failed CI, mitigating the risk of shipping broken code.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from external sources, specifically Slack bot messages and GitHub PR metadata (titles and descriptions). A malicious actor could attempt to embed instructions within a PR to influence the agent's backporting logic.
  • Ingestion points: Slack channel C09K9TPU2G7 and GitHub PR details retrieved via gh pr view (SKILL.md, reference/discovery.md).
  • Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or safety delimiters are used when processing the text content of PRs or Slack messages.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including shell execution (git, gh, pnpm) and Python execution for conflict resolution (SKILL.md, reference/execution.md).
  • Sanitization: The skill lacks sanitization for the external data it processes, relying instead on its internal categorization rules to skip certain types of PRs.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses Python regex snippets to programmatically resolve git merge conflicts. The logic is hardcoded and used specifically for standard conflict markers (<<<<<<< HEAD), which is a legitimate automation technique for minor code conflicts.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 31, 2026, 03:16 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — backport-management