internal-comms
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions (e.g., in
examples/faq-answers.mdandexamples/3p-updates.md) direct the agent to ingest data from untrusted or external sources like Slack posts, emails, and shared documents. This creates a surface where malicious instructions could be embedded in corporate data to influence the agent's output or behavior. - Ingestion points: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to use tools to read from
Slack,Google Drive,Email, andCalendaracross multiple instruction files. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters provided to the agent to treat information from these sources as data only and to ignore any embedded instructions (e.g., 'Ignore previous instructions' hidden in a Slack message).
- Capability inventory: The skill primarily uses read operations on sensitive communication tools and write operations (drafting responses) back to the user or Slack/Email contexts.
- Sanitization: The skill lacks sanitization steps or filtering logic for the external content it aggregates.
Audit Metadata