mcp-builder

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The evaluation framework in scripts/evaluation.py enables the execution of arbitrary local commands to launch and interact with MCP servers.
  • Evidence: The script utilizes CLI arguments (-c/--command and -a/--args) to parameterize shell commands that are subsequently executed via the mcp library's stdio_client transport.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's evaluation workflow ingests content from XML files, exposing the agent to indirect prompt injection from untrusted test suites.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/evaluation.py parses question and answer fields from <qa_pair> elements in local XML files.
  • Boundary markers: While the evaluation loop uses a system prompt to define the assistant's role, it lacks robust delimiters or instructions to prevent the agent from obeying malicious directives embedded within the test questions.
  • Capability inventory: The internal agent has the authority to invoke any tool exposed by the MCP server connection established by the harness.
  • Sanitization: Input from XML files is processed directly without filtering or adversarial sanitization.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The provided scripts dynamically initialize process environments and execute code based on runtime configuration.
  • Evidence: scripts/connections.py manages a MCPConnection abstraction that dynamically selects transport layers and spawns subprocesses with user-provided environment variables and arguments.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 21, 2026, 02:18 PM