mcp-builder
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The evaluation framework in
scripts/evaluation.pyenables the execution of arbitrary local commands to launch and interact with MCP servers. - Evidence: The script utilizes CLI arguments (
-c/--commandand-a/--args) to parameterize shell commands that are subsequently executed via themcplibrary'sstdio_clienttransport. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's evaluation workflow ingests content from XML files, exposing the agent to indirect prompt injection from untrusted test suites.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/evaluation.pyparsesquestionandanswerfields from<qa_pair>elements in local XML files. - Boundary markers: While the evaluation loop uses a system prompt to define the assistant's role, it lacks robust delimiters or instructions to prevent the agent from obeying malicious directives embedded within the test questions.
- Capability inventory: The internal agent has the authority to invoke any tool exposed by the MCP server connection established by the harness.
- Sanitization: Input from XML files is processed directly without filtering or adversarial sanitization.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The provided scripts dynamically initialize process environments and execute code based on runtime configuration.
- Evidence:
scripts/connections.pymanages aMCPConnectionabstraction that dynamically selects transport layers and spawns subprocesses with user-provided environment variables and arguments.
Audit Metadata