gh-address-comments
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/fetch_comments.pyexecutesghCLI commands usingsubprocess.run. While the implementation correctly uses list-based arguments to avoid shell injection, the skill relies on executing external binaries that interact with the host environment and network. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and acting upon untrusted data from GitHub.
- Ingestion points: The
fetch_allfunction inscripts/fetch_comments.pyretrieves the body text of pull request comments, reviews, and review threads via the GitHub GraphQL API. - Boundary markers: The skill instructions in
SKILL.mdlack explicit delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore command-like text embedded within the PR comments. - Capability inventory: The agent is instructed to 'Apply fixes' for selected comments, giving it file-system write capabilities, while the skill itself utilizes
ghfor network-based API calls. - Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or escaping is performed on the retrieved comment content before it is processed by the agent.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The instructions in
SKILL.mdexplicitly prompt the user to rungh auth loginand requestsandbox_permissions=require_escalatedto verify authentication status. This indicates a requirement for elevated environment privileges to manage GitHub credentials.
Audit Metadata