composio-cli
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 27, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to download an installation script from the vendor's official domain at
https://composio.dev/install. This is a documented procedure for setting up the Composio CLI environment. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation command
curl -fsSL https://composio.dev/install | bashpipes a remote script directly into the shell. While this is a common installation pattern for CLI tools, it involves executing remote code. The source is the official domain of the service provider. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several CLI commands to perform its functions:
composio execute: Runs specific tool actions defined by the service.composio run --file ./workflow.ts: Executes local TypeScript files to automate multi-step workflows.composio proxy: Allows authenticated API calls to external URLs via the platform's authentication management.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill processes data fetched from external SaaS applications (such as Slack, GitHub, or Gmail). This creates an ingestion surface for indirect prompt injection where instructions embedded in external content could potentially influence the agent's logic.
- Ingestion points: Data retrieved via
composio execute,composio proxy, andcomposio listen(triggers). - Boundary markers: None explicitly defined in the instructions to separate external data from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: File system access (via
--file), network proxying, and arbitrary tool execution across integrated platforms. - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or validation logic for the content of retrieved data is described.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://composio.dev/install - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata