eval-audit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process external and potentially untrusted data, including application traces, evaluation datasets, and human labels. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in the data could attempt to influence the agent's analysis or audit results. \n
- Ingestion points: Ingestion points for traces and datasets are defined in SKILL.md (Gather evidence) and references/managed.md (Inspect a real existing trace). \n
- Boundary markers: The skill mentions redacting at collection boundaries (references/workflow.md) but lacks explicit delimiters for instructions. \n
- Capability Inventory: The skill instructions involve writing files to the local workspace and executing evaluation runners (references/toolkit.md). \n
- Sanitization: The instructions mention redacting secrets but do not describe specific sanitization for indirect prompt injection. \n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The workspace setup script dynamically generates executable code by reading from a templates directory and applying string modifications for path configuration. \n
- Evidence:
scripts/setup_workspace.pyreads file content from a templates folder and uses.replace('.eval/default', root.as_posix())to inject the workspace root path before writing the files to the local directory as new Python or JavaScript scripts. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions frequently prompt the user to execute various Python and Node.js scripts generated during the setup process to perform evaluation tasks, server hosting, and reporting. \n - Evidence:
references/toolkit.mdandreferences/workflow.mdlist commands likepython .eval/default/scripts/run_evals.pyandpython .eval/default/review-app/server.py.
Audit Metadata