raycast-extensions
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The file
evals/fixtures/dictionary-flawed/src/search.tsxcontains a hardcoded stringAPI_KEY = "dict_live_sk_8f3a9b2c1d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e". - Evidence: The source code explicitly labels this as a "deliberately planted hardcoded secret" intended for testing the skill's store-review detection capabilities. As a dummy value in a pedagogical fixture, it does not pose a real-world security risk.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents the creation of AI Tools which ingest untrusted data from external services and user inputs.
- Ingestion points: External REST APIs fetched via
useFetch(e.g.,src/search.tsx) and arguments passed to AI tools insrc/tools/. - Boundary markers: The skill instructs users to define tool input schemas using the
Inputtype and use JSDoc to guide the LLM's parameter selection. - Capability inventory: Extensions can perform network operations, local file system access (via
useExecoruseSQL), and state mutations. - Sanitization: The skill mandates the use of a
confirmationexport for any tools performing destructive or mutating actions, ensuring user oversight for high-risk operations.
Audit Metadata