constructive-agents

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 27, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) pipeline which creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if retrieved documents contain malicious instructions.\n
  • Ingestion points: Data is ingested through ProcessFileEmbedding and SearchUnified nodes in SKILL.md and retrieved from database collections as shown in references/rag-pipeline.md.\n
  • Boundary markers: Prompt templates in references/agentic-kit.md use basic text identifiers (Context:, Question:) to segment external data from system instructions.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses the agentic-kit library to process retrieved context and generate natural language responses.\n
  • Sanitization: The provided examples do not include explicit sanitization or filtering logic for external content prior to prompt interpolation.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill depends on several external Node.js packages for LLM provider abstraction.\n
  • It utilizes agentic-kit, @agentic-kit/ollama, @agentic-kit/anthropic, and @agentic-kit/openai for model connectivity.\n
  • It references the official vendor repository at github.com/constructive-io/agentic-kit for library source code.\n- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill demonstrates secure handling of sensitive authentication data.\n
  • It instructs developers to use process.env.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY and process.env.OPENAI_API_KEY for API access, which follows secret management best practices by avoiding hardcoded credentials.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 27, 2026, 01:06 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — constructive-agents