constructive-agents
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) pipeline which creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if retrieved documents contain malicious instructions.\n
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested through
ProcessFileEmbeddingandSearchUnifiednodes inSKILL.mdand retrieved from database collections as shown inreferences/rag-pipeline.md.\n - Boundary markers: Prompt templates in
references/agentic-kit.mduse basic text identifiers (Context:,Question:) to segment external data from system instructions.\n - Capability inventory: The skill uses the
agentic-kitlibrary to process retrieved context and generate natural language responses.\n - Sanitization: The provided examples do not include explicit sanitization or filtering logic for external content prior to prompt interpolation.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill depends on several external Node.js packages for LLM provider abstraction.\n
- It utilizes
agentic-kit,@agentic-kit/ollama,@agentic-kit/anthropic, and@agentic-kit/openaifor model connectivity.\n - It references the official vendor repository at
github.com/constructive-io/agentic-kitfor library source code.\n- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill demonstrates secure handling of sensitive authentication data.\n - It instructs developers to use
process.env.ANTHROPIC_API_KEYandprocess.env.OPENAI_API_KEYfor API access, which follows secret management best practices by avoiding hardcoded credentials.
Audit Metadata