copilotkit-integrations
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides examples of agent architectures that interpolate user-provided or state-derived data directly into system and user prompts without explicit boundary markers. This is a standard operational pattern for LLM agents but represents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.\n
- Ingestion points: User messages and shared state (e.g.,
proverbslist) are ingested through the AG-UI protocol and processed by the agent (e.g., inreferences/integrations/adk.mdandreferences/integrations/strands.md).\n - Boundary markers: The illustrative code snippets, such as
before_model_modifierinadk.mdandbuild_proverbs_promptinstrands.md, do not utilize delimiters or specific instructions to isolate or ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within the interpolated data.\n - Capability inventory: The agents described in the guides have access to various capabilities including network requests (via weather and financial tools) and state modification (via update tools) (e.g., in
references/integrations/adk.md,references/integrations/agno.md, andreferences/integrations/strands.md).\n - Sanitization: No explicit input validation, escaping, or sanitization of the interpolated state data is present in the provided documentation examples.
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