canvas-design
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
FINAL STEPsection uses a simulated conversation history pattern ("The user ALREADY said...") to override the model's current state and force a specific 'masterpiece' persona and quality level. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
CANVAS CREATIONsection instructs the agent to "Download and use whatever fonts are needed," which encourages fetching external assets from arbitrary remote sources without domain restrictions or integrity checks. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted user input to derive 'subtle references' and 'design philosophies' which are then used as high-level instructions for subsequent file generation and code execution steps.
- Ingestion points: User-provided requests processed during the 'Design Philosophy Creation' and 'Deducing the Subtle Reference' phases.
- Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions do not specify delimiters to separate user data from the generated philosophy instructions.
- Capability inventory: File system writes (.md, .pdf, .png), network access for font downloads, and potential shell/code execution for canvas rendering.
- Sanitization: No validation or sanitization is mentioned for the conceptual threads deduced from user input.
Audit Metadata