classify-review
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The execution pattern
bash ~/.claude/scripts/classify-review-state.sh <PR番号> "$VERDICTS_JSON" <OWNER/REPO>uses user-provided arguments directly within a shell command template. This presents a potential command injection risk if the agent does not properly escape the<PR番号>input before execution. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection where untrusted data could influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: External review comments are loaded from
pending-review-comments.json(which mirrors GitHub data) into theraw_commentsvariable inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack robust delimiters (such as XML tags or randomized separators) for the
{raw_comments}interpolation, using only a markdown header## コメント一覧to separate data from instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses
BashandAgenttools, allowing it to execute scripts and invoke subagents based on the content of external data. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of text sanitization or instruction-filtering for the PR comments before they are passed to the Haiku subagent, relying instead on a downstream validation script.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads sensitive local state files containing PR review information from
~/.claude/state/pending-review-comments.json. While used for its primary purpose, this access to application-specific state files should be monitored to ensure data is not inadvertently exposed or modified outside of the intended workflow.
Audit Metadata