castmate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
subprocessmodule inscripts/castmate.pyto execute external AI CLI binaries (e.g.,claude,codex,gemini,agy). It correctly implements list-based argument passing instead of shell strings, which prevents shell command injection. Additionally, it implements an environment variable denylist (e.g.,LD_PRELOAD,PYTHONPATH,BASH_ENV) in thesafe_envfunction to prevent the leakage of sensitive system variables to the subprocesses. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to ingest project files and git diffs and pass them to other AI models. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious code in a processed repository could attempt to subvert the instructions of the host or castmate agents.
- Ingestion points: Local files and git diffs are read in
SKILL.md(Step 3) and passed into templates inreferences/prompt-template.md. - Boundary markers: The skill uses Markdown headers (e.g.,
# Task,## Scope) to delimit instructions from data, but does not employ strict escaping or XML-style tagging for untrusted content. - Capability inventory: The
scripts/castmate.pyscript can execute arbitrary local binaries and write model outputs to the filesystem. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering is applied to the code content before it is interpolated into the prompts.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Documentation in
references/cli-setup.mdprovides shell commands for installing official AI CLI tools. These downloads are hosted on trusted or well-known service domains, includingclaude.ai(Anthropic),google.com(Google), and the officialnpmjs.comregistry for Codex and Gemini packages.
Audit Metadata