deep-research

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 11, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses highly sensitive local data through the following mechanisms:
    • It executes grep against ~/.claude/memory/ to retrieve historical user context and prior decisions.
    • It accesses and reads from ${MAKERSKILLS_CONFIG:-$HOME/.config/makerskills}/deep-research/archive/.
    • The skill simultaneously uses network-enabled tools (WebSearch, WebFetch, agent-browser) which could potentially receive or process fragments of this sensitive local data during the synthesis phase.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell-level commands and filesystem operations to manage its research corpus:
    • Uses grep for searching local directories (~/.claude/memory/ and archive paths).
    • Performs filesystem writes to save research briefs to ~/.config/makerskills/deep-research/archive/.
    • Instructs a file migration operation: "move those files into the archive directory first" if an old structure exists.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) due to its core function of processing untrusted web data:
    • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent via WebSearch, WebFetch, and the agent-browser tool which hits arbitrary URLs.
    • Boundary markers: There are no instructions provided to wrap external content in delimiters or to ignore potential instructions embedded in the fetched web pages.
    • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to read private user memory via grep, interact with the Notion API (using $NOTION_API_KEY), and write to the local filesystem.
    • Sanitization: The instructions do not define any sanitization or validation steps for content retrieved from the web before it is synthesized into the final brief.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 11, 2026, 09:45 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — deep-research