deep-research
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses highly sensitive local data through the following mechanisms:
- It executes
grepagainst~/.claude/memory/to retrieve historical user context and prior decisions. - It accesses and reads from
${MAKERSKILLS_CONFIG:-$HOME/.config/makerskills}/deep-research/archive/. - The skill simultaneously uses network-enabled tools (
WebSearch,WebFetch,agent-browser) which could potentially receive or process fragments of this sensitive local data during the synthesis phase.
- It executes
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell-level commands and filesystem operations to manage its research corpus:
- Uses
grepfor searching local directories (~/.claude/memory/and archive paths). - Performs filesystem writes to save research briefs to
~/.config/makerskills/deep-research/archive/. - Instructs a file migration operation: "move those files into the archive directory first" if an old structure exists.
- Uses
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) due to its core function of processing untrusted web data:
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent via
WebSearch,WebFetch, and theagent-browsertool which hits arbitrary URLs. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions provided to wrap external content in delimiters or to ignore potential instructions embedded in the fetched web pages.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to read private user memory via
grep, interact with the Notion API (using$NOTION_API_KEY), and write to the local filesystem. - Sanitization: The instructions do not define any sanitization or validation steps for content retrieved from the web before it is synthesized into the final brief.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent via
Audit Metadata