ingest

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process untrusted "raw human input" like meeting transcripts and forwarded messages, which serves as a significant vector for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Ingests untrusted data through prompt text and the pbpaste command as described in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions include safety constraints such as drafting rather than sending replies and requiring user confirmation for sensitive items like credentials or legal commitments.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to create GitHub issues via the gh CLI, write to a local vault directory, and modify the people.yaml configuration file.
  • Sanitization: The skill performs name spelling verification against a known config but lacks explicit sanitization or escaping of the raw input before it is used to generate GitHub issues or file contents.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Utilizes multiple shell-based tools to interact with the system and external services.
  • Evidence: Executes pbpaste to access clipboard data, gh issue list and gh issue create to manage GitHub tasks, and potentially uses the keep CLI for note management.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Accesses and stores data in sensitive local directories and configuration files.
  • Evidence: Reads and updates routing configuration in ${HOME}/.config/makerskills/ingest/people.yaml and writes extracted decisions and facts to a local vault in ${HOME}/Documents/SecondBrain.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 5, 2026, 10:11 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — ingest