ingest
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process untrusted "raw human input" like meeting transcripts and forwarded messages, which serves as a significant vector for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Ingests untrusted data through prompt text and the
pbpastecommand as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions include safety constraints such as drafting rather than sending replies and requiring user confirmation for sensitive items like credentials or legal commitments.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to create GitHub issues via the
ghCLI, write to a local vault directory, and modify thepeople.yamlconfiguration file. - Sanitization: The skill performs name spelling verification against a known config but lacks explicit sanitization or escaping of the raw input before it is used to generate GitHub issues or file contents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Utilizes multiple shell-based tools to interact with the system and external services.
- Evidence: Executes
pbpasteto access clipboard data,gh issue listandgh issue createto manage GitHub tasks, and potentially uses thekeepCLI for note management. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Accesses and stores data in sensitive local directories and configuration files.
- Evidence: Reads and updates routing configuration in
${HOME}/.config/makerskills/ingest/people.yamland writes extracted decisions and facts to a local vault in${HOME}/Documents/SecondBrain.
Audit Metadata