paste
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes several local system commands to perform its reformatting and output tasks. * Evidence: The skill uses
pbpasteto ingest content andpbcopyto output the cleaned results to the clipboard. * Evidence: The skill uses theopencommand to launch browsers for viewing generated HTML files. * Evidence: Mentions the possible use ofpandocfor document format conversion. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses system data and internal configuration paths. * Evidence: It reads the full content of the system clipboard, which often contains sensitive user data or temporary credentials. * Evidence: It references a specific internal agent memory file located at
~/.claude/memory/feedback_social_link_placement.md. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from the clipboard or user prompts without explicit boundary markers, creating a surface for injection. * Ingestion points: Data is pulled directly from the clipboard via
pbpasteor from user-provided prompt text. * Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific delimiters or directions for the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the text being cleaned. * Capability inventory: The skill has the power to write to the clipboard (pbcopy), write files to the/tmpdirectory, and execute local commands (open). * Sanitization: While the skill cleans terminal artifacts and ANSI codes, it does not include sanitization or filtering to prevent the agent from following natural language instructions found in the input.
Audit Metadata