second-brain
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation includes shell commands for document rendering and system configuration.
- Evidence in
references/schema.mdprovides commands forpandoc,brew, andtlmgrto convert markdown to PDF or HTML. - The documentation includes a
sudocommand for updating the TeX Live manager (sudo tlmgr update --self). - Shell commands for searching the vault involve using
grepacross local directories. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a high surface area for indirect prompt injection due to its core workflow.
- Ingestion points: The
capturemode (SKILL.md) fetches content from external URLs, tweets, and articles, saving them to araw/folder. - Capability inventory: The skill performs file read/write operations and executes shell commands based on the processed data.
- Sanitization: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters used to prevent the agent from following malicious instructions contained within the captured external text during the
compileorqueryphases. - Boundary markers: While the skill separates
raw/andwiki/content, it does not instruct the agent to ignore instructions embedded in the source material. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill is designed to interact with the user's local filesystem.
- It accesses the directory defined by the environment variable
$SECOND_BRAIN_VAULTor defaults to$HOME/Documents/SecondBrain. - It reads configuration files like
CLAUDE.mdfrom the vault root and references files in~/.local/share/makerskills/.
Audit Metadata