second-brain
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes shell command templates for document rendering using
pandoc. These templates interpolate variables such as<file>and<title>(found inreferences/schema.md) which are derived from user-provided questions or content titles. If these values are not properly sanitized of shell metacharacters (e.g.,;,|,`), it could lead to arbitrary command execution. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection. It is designed to capture content from arbitrary external URLs and store it as 'raw' notes, which are later processed into a structured 'wiki' and used to answer queries.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.mddefines acapturemode that fetches content from URLs, PDFs, and web articles into the local vault. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions provided to the agent to use delimiters or to ignore embedded instructions within the captured content during the
compileorqueryphases. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses file read/write capabilities, shell execution via
pandocandgit, and network access for content fetching. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or content validation steps are defined before processing ingested data or using it in query responses.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill incorporates synchronization with remote Git repositories using
git pull --rebase --autostashand references external services and tools such asexecutor.shandpandocfor its core functionality. While these are common developer tools, they represent vectors for interacting with external, potentially untrusted sources.
Audit Metadata