github-multi-repo

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 10, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses the gh CLI and shell commands through Bash() blocks to discover repositories, manage file systems, and coordinate development workflows across multiple projects.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Clones remote repositories from GitHub using gh repo clone and uses npx to run remote packages and tools.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill performs npm update and npm test on repositories cloned from external sources. This presents a risk where malicious lifecycle scripts or test files in a repository could execute arbitrary code on the runner.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's metadata lists 'Claude Flow Team' as the author, which differs from the identified author 'Cornjebus'; such discrepancies can be deceptive. Additionally, the skill ingests untrusted content from remote repositories (metadata and file contents) which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's actions.
  • Ingestion points: Repository metadata from gh repo list and file contents (e.g., package.json, CLAUDE.md) from GitHub API calls are loaded into the agent's context.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are used to separate untrusted external data from the skill's instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for shell command execution, file system modification, and GitHub repository write access.
  • Sanitization: There is no validation or sanitization of content retrieved from external repositories before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 10, 2026, 02:11 PM