github-multi-repo
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 10, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses the
ghCLI and shell commands throughBash()blocks to discover repositories, manage file systems, and coordinate development workflows across multiple projects. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Clones remote repositories from GitHub using
gh repo cloneand usesnpxto run remote packages and tools. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill performs
npm updateandnpm teston repositories cloned from external sources. This presents a risk where malicious lifecycle scripts or test files in a repository could execute arbitrary code on the runner. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's metadata lists 'Claude Flow Team' as the author, which differs from the identified author 'Cornjebus'; such discrepancies can be deceptive. Additionally, the skill ingests untrusted content from remote repositories (metadata and file contents) which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's actions.
- Ingestion points: Repository metadata from
gh repo listand file contents (e.g.,package.json,CLAUDE.md) from GitHub API calls are loaded into the agent's context. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are used to separate untrusted external data from the skill's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for shell command execution, file system modification, and GitHub repository write access.
- Sanitization: There is no validation or sanitization of content retrieved from external repositories before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata