playlist-archiver
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands and external utilities such as
yt-dlpandjqfor media processing. It further provides detailed configurations for establishing automated persistence throughcrontabandsystemduser timers to handle recurring archive updates. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill facilitates network communication with external media platforms including YouTube, Vimeo, and Twitch to retrieve media files and metadata. These operations target well-known services and do not involve sensitive local data.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted metadata from remote media platforms, which constitutes an indirect prompt injection surface.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via
info.jsonmetadata generated byyt-dlpduring playlist and channel extraction (processed inMediaOrganizerandMediaLibraryclasses). - Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded content are provided for the agent when processing this data.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for file system modification (
shutil.move,os.makedirs), shell command execution (subprocess.run), and database writes (sqlite3). - Sanitization: The
MediaOrganizerclass implements a_sanitizemethod that uses regex to strip common directory traversal and illegal characters from metadata before using them in file paths.
Audit Metadata