loom-argocd
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 25, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches Kubernetes manifests from the Argo Project's official GitHub repository for installation.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Contains instructions to access sensitive local file paths, specifically
~/.ssh/id_rsa, during repository registration. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Includes commands to retrieve sensitive administrative credentials, such as the
argocd-initial-admin-secret, from the Kubernetes environment. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface through the ingestion of external Git repository data without boundary markers or sanitization, combined with shell execution capabilities. Evidence: 1. Ingestion points: Git repositories defined in
repoURLfields within Application manifests. 2. Boundary markers: Absent. 3. Capability inventory:Bash(kubectl/argocd CLI) andWrite. 4. Sanitization: Absent. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Executes multiple shell commands using
kubectlandargocdto manage cluster resources and application lifecycle.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata