docx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various system commands to perform document processing tasks. \n
scripts/office/soffice.pyrunsgccto compile a shim library and then executes thesofficebinary. \nscripts/accept_changes.pyinvokessofficein headless mode to process tracked changes in Word documents. \nscripts/office/validators/redlining.pyexecutesgit diffto compare and validate text content differences between document versions.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill performs dynamic code compilation and library injection. \nscripts/office/soffice.pywrites a C source string to a temporary file, compiles it usinggcc, and then uses theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable to inject the resulting shared library into the LibreOffice process. This technique is used to bypass network socket restrictions in sandboxed environments but involves high-risk execution patterns. \nscripts/accept_changes.pygenerates and writes a LibreOffice Basic macro to a configuration file before executing it, representing dynamic script generation.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill extracts content from untrusted document files, exposing an indirect prompt injection surface. \n- Ingestion point: Document XML content is unpacked and extracted in
scripts/office/unpack.py. \n - Boundary markers: The skill's instructions do not include specific delimiters or warnings for the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions found within extracted document text. \n
- Capability inventory: The skill provides the agent with powerful tools for command execution and file system access across multiple scripts. \n
- Sanitization: While
defusedxmlis used to mitigate XML-specific attacks, there is no validation or filtering of the natural language text content extracted from the documents.
Audit Metadata