gmail-manager
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it is designed to read and process data from external, untrusted senders via Gmail.
- Ingestion points: The tools
GMAIL_FETCH_EMAILS,GMAIL_GET_EMAIL_BY_ID, andGMAIL_GET_THREAD(referenced inSKILL.md) provide the agent with direct access to untrusted email bodies. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters defined to separate user/system instructions from the content of the emails being processed.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to several high-privilege tools, such as
GMAIL_SEND_EMAIL,GMAIL_BATCH_MODIFY_MESSAGES, andGMAIL_TRASH_MESSAGE(referenced inSKILL.md), which could be misused if the agent follows malicious instructions found within an email. - Sanitization: The skill lacks specified logic for sanitizing or validating email content before it is processed or used in further tool calls.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is configured to interact with an external API at
https://app.rubeai.io/mcp. This workflow involves transmitting potentially sensitive user communication data and theRUBE_API_KEYto a third-party domain that is not part of the established trusted vendor list. While this is the intended purpose of the integration, it represents a data exposure surface.
Audit Metadata