skills/craftos-dev/craftbot/obsidian/Gen Agent Trust Hub

obsidian

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 26, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of obsidian-cli via a third-party Homebrew tap (yakitrak/yakitrak/obsidian-cli). This involves downloading and executing installation scripts and binaries from an external, non-verified source.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary functionality relies on executing the obsidian-cli binary to perform file operations like search, create, move, and delete within the local file system.
  • [DATA_ACCESS]: The instructions direct the agent to read sensitive local application data at ~/Library/Application Support/obsidian/obsidian.json to identify vault paths and states.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through the following surface:
  • Ingestion points: The agent reads the content of arbitrary Markdown files (*.md) within the Obsidian vault during search and edit operations.
  • Boundary markers: There are no instructions to use delimiters or ignore embedded instructions when processing note content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to the filesystem, rename files, and delete notes via obsidian-cli.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation for the content retrieved from notes before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 26, 2026, 05:35 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — obsidian