outlook
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from email bodies and calendar events, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions in an email could influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/outlook-mail.shandscripts/outlook-calendar.shfetch content from external sources. - Boundary markers: The scripts do not use delimiters or instructions to isolate untrusted content from the agent's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill includes tools to send emails, delete messages, and modify calendar entries, which could be abused if an injection is successful.
- Sanitization: Basic HTML tag removal is performed, but no semantic filtering for malicious instructions is implemented.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell scripts that interpolate user-provided arguments into
curlcommands andjqfilters. - Evidence: Arguments such as subject, body, and search queries are directly inserted into JSON payloads and URL strings in
scripts/outlook-mail.shandscripts/outlook-calendar.sh, which could allow for JSON structure manipulation or URL parameter injection. - Evidence: The attachment download command in
scripts/outlook-mail.shis potentially vulnerable to path traversal if a message contains an attachment with a malicious filename. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to read and manipulate sensitive user information, including full email content and calendar metadata.
- Evidence: The skill facilitates access to private communications and schedules as part of its core functionality.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The scripts interact with well-known Microsoft services for data management and authentication.
- Evidence: Network requests are made to official endpoints including
graph.microsoft.comandlogin.microsoftonline.com.
Audit Metadata