pptx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently uses
subprocess.runto execute system binaries includingsoffice,pdftoppm, andgit. Most notably,scripts/office/soffice.pyinvokesgccto compile C source code into a shared object file at runtime.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scriptscripts/office/soffice.pyimplements process injection by loading a dynamically compiled shared library via theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable. This technique shims the LibreOffice process to bypass environmental restrictions on Unix domain sockets, which is a high-risk behavior usually associated with malware or sandbox escapes.- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation requires the manual installation of several third-party dependencies from public registries. This includes Python packages likemarkitdownandPillow, and Node.js packages likepptxgenjs,react-icons, andsharp.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the ingestion of untrusted data from.pptxfiles. This content is converted to text and images and then presented to the agent and subagents for visual inspection. This introduces a surface for indirect prompt injection where instructions hidden in the slide content could manipulate the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points:
SKILL.md,editing.md(content extracted viamarkitdown). - Boundary markers: Absent.
- Capability inventory:
scripts/office/pack.py(file-write),scripts/office/soffice.py(subprocess execution). - Sanitization: Absent.
Audit Metadata