xlsx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill performs runtime compilation and process injection to facilitate its formula recalculation feature. Specifically,
scripts/office/soffice.pywrites an embedded C source to a temporary file, compiles it usinggccinto a shared library, and then uses theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable to inject this shim into thesofficeprocess. This is designed to redirect Unix socket calls to enable communication in restricted environments. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes several external binaries via
subprocess.run. This includessofficefor spreadsheet processing,gccfor the shim compilation,gtimeoutfor execution limits, andgitfor comparing document versions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted spreadsheet data, which represents a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection. 1. Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through files read via
pandas.read_excelandopenpyxl.load_workbook. 2. Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore instructions within the data are provided to the model. 3. Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands and modify the filesystem. 4. Sanitization: It employs thedefusedxmllibrary for document parsing to protect against several XML-specific attack vectors.
Audit Metadata