open-notebook

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 14, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's setup instructions require the agent or user to download a docker-compose.yml file from an external GitHub repository (https://raw.githubusercontent.com/lfnovo/open-notebook/main/docker-compose.yml) which is not from a verified trusted organization.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its data ingestion capabilities.
  • Ingestion points: The skill processes external content including web URLs, PDFs, and Office documents via the /api/sources endpoint, as documented in SKILL.md and references/api_reference.md.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit instructions or delimiters are provided to the agent to disregard instructions potentially embedded within the processed research materials.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands (docker-compose), perform network operations (requests), and write to the local filesystem (curl -o). These capabilities could be triggered maliciously if the agent follows instructions found inside untrusted ingested documents.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation logic for external content in the provided scripts.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the execution of local shell commands for deployment and configuration, specifically using docker-compose up -d to launch services and export to set encryption keys.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The file scripts/test_open_notebook_skill.py contains a call to the Python compile() function to parse the contents of other scripts. While used for syntax validation within a test suite, this pattern involves the dynamic parsing of code content.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 14, 2026, 09:23 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — open-notebook