tts
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's documentation in
SKILL.mddirects the agent to install thevox-clitool directly from a third-party GitHub repository (https://github.com/3Craft/tts.git). This involves cloning the repository and runningpipx install ., which executes setup code from the unverified source on the host system. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The wrapper script
scripts/vox_tts.pyuses thesubprocessmodule to execute thevoxbinary. Although it passes arguments as a list to prevent shell injection, it still facilitates the execution of external code that was installed from an unverified source. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an indirect prompt injection surface as it processes untrusted user-supplied text and audio files.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted text is accepted via the
textargument incmd_speak,cmd_design, andcmd_clone; untrusted audio is processed via theaudioandrefarguments inscripts/vox_tts.py. - Boundary markers: There are no delimiters or specific instructions to ensure the model or the underlying CLI tool ignores malicious instructions that might be embedded in the user-provided text or audio metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes system commands using the
voxbinary via thesubprocess.runfunction inscripts/vox_tts.py. - Sanitization: No validation or sanitization of user-provided inputs is performed before they are passed as arguments to the external tool.
Audit Metadata