transcript-extractor
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses the
yt-dlputility inscripts/download-audio.mjsto download media from user-provided URLs. This is a standard and expected function for media processing skills.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes external binaries (yt-dlpandffmpeg) vianode:child_processand Python'ssubprocessmodule. Both implementations inscripts/download-audio.mjsandscripts/transcribe.pyuse argument arrays rather than shell strings, which is the recommended practice to prevent command injection vulnerabilities.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted media content to generate transcripts. If the transcribed text is subsequently used by an agent, there is a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if the media contains spoken instructions intended to manipulate the agent.\n - Ingestion points: Media files or URLs processed by
yt-dlpand Whisper in the provided scripts.\n - Boundary markers: The output is structured in JSON format, which provides a natural delimiter, though the prompt does not explicitly instruct the agent to ignore instructions within the transcript text.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file writing and subprocess execution capabilities needed for media transformation.\n
- Sanitization: The skill relies on the Whisper model for transcription and does not perform secondary text sanitization on the resulting transcript.
Audit Metadata