android-reverse-engineering
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
install-dep.shandinstall-dep.ps1scripts download several third-party tools (jadx, Vineflower, dex2jar) directly from their official GitHub repositories. These are well-known open-source projects in the security community. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The installation scripts (
install-dep.sh) usesudoto invoke system package managers (apt,dnf,pacman) when installing dependencies like the Java JDK or platform tools. This is standard behavior for system-wide software installation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
decompile.shandinstall-dep.shscripts use shell commands for file management, tool execution, and environment configuration (e.g.,unzip,realpath,chmod,ln). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze untrusted Android packages (APK, XAPK, JAR). These files contain code and resources that could theoretically harbor malicious instructions intended to influence the agent's analysis or output.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via the input file provided to
decompile.shanddecompile.ps1. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or warnings to disregard instructions found within the decompiled code.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution, network downloads (
curl/wget), and file writes across all scripts (scripts/). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of the content extracted from the Android packages.
Audit Metadata