pstack-runtime
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/roles.pyusesimportlib.import_moduleto load submodules from the_rolesdirectory into a dynamically generated namespace (aliased viauuid). This technique is used to prevent module caching issues but involves runtime assembly of executable code. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runinscripts/_roles/mode.pyto executegitcommands for repository analysis. Additionally,SKILL.mdcontains instructions for an 'ACP fallback' which involves executing shell commands with specific environment variables (ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE=1) to bridge MCP tools to the terminal. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it is designed to process external, potentially untrusted data.
- Ingestion points: Processes transcript files (
SKILL.md), webhook payloads (webhooks.md), and pull request activity/comments (watching.md). - Boundary markers: Documentation in
webhooks.mdindicates the platform wraps incoming data in<webhook-data-ID>frames to distinguish it from instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill can spawn child tasks (
delegate_task), schedule recurring work (schedule_task), and send messages across threads. - Sanitization: The skill provides explicit developer warnings in
webhooks.mdto avoid directly using payload strings in commands or paths, recommending that agents only act on allowlisted identifiers found within the data.
Audit Metadata