swarm
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a fan-out and aggregate pattern where an orchestrator agent processes results from multiple parallel workers, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: In Phase C (Aggregate), the orchestrator reads terminal results produced by workers via the
delegate_tasktool. - Boundary markers: The instructions advise the agent to "not paste raw worker dumps" and to create a "consolidated in-chat report," but there are no explicit prompt delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings for the data being aggregated.
- Capability inventory: The orchestrator and its workers possess significant capabilities, including file system access, browser interaction, and access to local authentication credentials.
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization, escaping, or validation of the worker-provided content is required before the aggregator processes it.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses local Python scripts to manage roles and validate tasks.
- Evidence: The skill executes
python3 <pstack-runtime>/scripts/roles.pyin Phase A and Phase B to resolve agent roles and check task briefs.
Audit Metadata