app-questions
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill collects untrusted user input through an interactive Q&A workflow and interpolates this data into
CLAUDE.md, a file specifically designed to guide AI agent behavior. This creates a risk where malicious instructions provided by a user (or an external source influencing the user) could influence the agent's future actions. \n - Ingestion points: User answers during the 7-phase questionnaire and the interactive editor described in
SKILL.md. \n - Boundary markers: The template for
CLAUDE.mddoes not include delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious content within the user-supplied fields. \n - Capability inventory: The skill is designed to write files (
APP_DEFINITION.mdandCLAUDE.md) and interact with the user. \n - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the user input before it is written to the persistent guidance files. \n- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Phase 5 of the skill's discovery workflow explicitly asks the user for information regarding "secure secrets" and persists the response in plain text within
APP_DEFINITION.md. This practice encourages users to store sensitive credentials in a project documentation file that might be shared or committed to version control, rather than using a dedicated secrets manager or environment variables.
Audit Metadata