ai-low-hanging-fruit

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 9, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes several shell commands to manage the environment and sync data.
  • Evidence: Uses git rev-parse --show-toplevel to identify projects and ls to verify folder existence.
  • Evidence: Executes a multi-command shell string git -C "$V" add -A && git -C "$V" commit -m "<message>" && git -C "$V" push to synchronize changes.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is configured to automatically push local filesystem content to a remote Git repository.
  • Evidence: The 'Directory mode' instructions mandate that once files are written to the local vault at $HOME/Documents/obsidian/obsidian, the agent must stage all changes and execute a git push to the remote origin.
  • Risk: If the remote origin is misconfigured or if the vault contains sensitive information beyond the project plans, the agent may autonomously upload sensitive data to an external server.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8).
  • Ingestion points: Reads content from prd.md, plan.md, tech-spec.md, and direct user-pasted text (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not specify delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the source documents.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to write to the filesystem, modify existing index files, and perform git push operations.
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no mention of filtering or escaping content read from external files before processing it.
  • Risk: A malicious PRD or engineering plan could contain hidden instructions that the agent might follow, leading to unauthorized file modifications or exfiltration of other notes in the vault.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 9, 2026, 12:57 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — ai-low-hanging-fruit