ai-low-hanging-fruit
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes several shell commands to manage the environment and sync data.
- Evidence: Uses
git rev-parse --show-toplevelto identify projects andlsto verify folder existence. - Evidence: Executes a multi-command shell string
git -C "$V" add -A && git -C "$V" commit -m "<message>" && git -C "$V" pushto synchronize changes. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is configured to automatically push local filesystem content to a remote Git repository.
- Evidence: The 'Directory mode' instructions mandate that once files are written to the local vault at
$HOME/Documents/obsidian/obsidian, the agent must stage all changes and execute agit pushto the remote origin. - Risk: If the remote origin is misconfigured or if the vault contains sensitive information beyond the project plans, the agent may autonomously upload sensitive data to an external server.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: Reads content from
prd.md,plan.md,tech-spec.md, and direct user-pasted text (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not specify delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the source documents.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to write to the filesystem, modify existing index files, and perform
git pushoperations. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no mention of filtering or escaping content read from external files before processing it.
- Risk: A malicious PRD or engineering plan could contain hidden instructions that the agent might follow, leading to unauthorized file modifications or exfiltration of other notes in the vault.
Audit Metadata